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ABSTRACT
Although the role of ﬁnancial constraints on entrepreneurial choices has received considerable at-
tention, the eﬀects of these constraints on aggregate capital accumulation and wealth inequality are
less known. Entrepreneurship is an important determinant of capital accumulation and wealth con-
centration and, conversely, the distribution of wealth aﬀects entrepreneurial choices in the presence
of borrowing constraints. We construct a model that matches wealth inequality very well, for both
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and ﬁnd that more restrictive borrowing constraints generate
less wealth concentration, but also reduce average ﬁrm size, aggregate capital, and the fraction of
entrepreneurs. We also ﬁnd that voluntary bequests are an important channel that allows some
high-ability workers to establish or enlarge an entrepreneurial activity: with accidental bequests
only, there would be fewer large ﬁrms, fewer entrepreneurs, and less aggregate capital, but also less
wealth concentration.
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Many empirical studies ¯nd that potential and existing entrepreneurs face
borrowing constraints and that the decision to become an entrepreneur or
expand one's ¯rm depends on asset ownership, availability of collateral, and
receipt of bequests. (See, for example, Evans and Jovanovic [15], Gentry and
Hubbard [18], Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen [17], Hall [21], and Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian, and Rosen [22] and [23].)
Although the role of ¯nancial constraints for entrepreneurial choice has
received considerable attention, especially from an empirical point of view,
there has been so far very little work on how these constraints a®ect aggregate
capital accumulation and wealth inequality through entrepreneurial choices.
In the presence of borrowing constraints, the decision to invest, the frac-
tion of entrepreneurs, and the size distribution of ¯rms depend on the dis-
tribution of assets in the economy. The data show that wealth holdings are
extremely concentrated, much more than labor earnings and income (D¶ ³az-
Gim¶ enez, Quadrini, and R¶ ³os-Rull [14]), and that entrepreneurs are an impor-
tant force driving wealth concentration and aggregate capital accumulation
(Gentry and Hubbard [18] and Quadrini [32]).
In this paper we analyze the role of borrowing constraints as determinants
of entrepreneurial decisions (entry, continuation, investment, and saving), and
their e®ects on wealth inequality and aggregate capital accumulation, in a
framework that matches the observed wealth inequality very closely. Because
of the interaction between borrowing constraints and asset holdings, it is key
to perform such an analysis in a model that matches well the extreme concen-
1tration of wealth observed in the data.
We ¯nd that more restrictive borrowing constraints generate less inequality
in wealth holdings, but also reduce average ¯rm size, the number of people en-
gaging in entrepreneurial activities, and aggregate capital accumulation. Our
results also indicate that voluntary bequests are an important channel allow-
ing some high-ability workers to establish or enlarge an entrepreneurial activity
and that with accidental bequests only there would be fewer large ¯rms, fewer
entrepreneurs, and less aggregate capital, but also less wealth concentration.
These ¯ndings are based on a quantitative life-cycle model with altruism
across generations and entrepreneurial choice, in an environment in which debt
repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. The amount that entrepreneurs can
borrow depends, therefore, on their observable characteristics, and the en-
trepreneurs' assets act as collateral for their debts. Since the implicit rate of
return for entrepreneurs is higher than the rate for workers, and consistently
with the data, entrepreneurs have a higher saving rate. We calibrate the key
parameters of the model, such as entrepreneurial ability and degree of en-
forcement, to match key moments of the data and discuss the implications of
the model and its components for entrepreneurial choice and wealth inequal-
ity. We show that our model with entrepreneurial choice matches very well the
observed distribution of wealth, for both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.
This paper is related to various works that have studied wealth inequality,
entrepreneurial choice, and imperfectly enforceable contracts.
Casta~ neda, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, and R¶ ³os-Rull [9] adopt a dynastic model with
idiosyncratic shocks and reconstruct a labor income process that matches earn-
ings and wealth dispersion. De Nardi [13] evaluates the importance of bequest
2motives in explaining wealth dispersion in a life-cycle model. Neither of these
papers models entrepreneurial decisions.
Quadrini [33] shows that modeling entrepreneurship is important in ex-
plaining the observed concentration of wealth, but does not study the e®ects
of ¯nancing constraints. Other papers focus on the e®ects of various elements
on entrepreneurial choice. Li [29] examines the e®ects of government credit
subsidies; Carranza, Galdµ on-Sµ anchez, and Fernandez-Villaverde [8] focus on
the impact of capital markets imperfections; and Chari, Golosov, and Tsyvin-
ski [10] analyze the lock-in e®ect of capital gains taxation on business start-ups.
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [1] characterize optimal contracts and their
qualitative implications for ¯rm growth and survival in an environment in
which ¯rms face limited liability and repayment of debt cannot be perfectly
enforced. Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini [11] focus on the role of limited
contract enforceability in retarding the di®usion of new technologies.
2 Empirical evidence on entrepreneurship,
borrowing constraints, and wealth
This section discusses the evidence indicating that entrepreneurs are liquid-
ity constrained and have a higher saving rate than non-entrepreneurs. It also
highlights the key role of entrepreneurship in generating a skewed wealth dis-
tribution.
We use data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).1 Unlike
1The data for the 1992 and 1995 waves are similar. The results are available from the
3other data sets (such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Health
and Retirement Survey), the SCF oversamples rich households and thus pro-
vides important advantages. First, it gives a better picture of the concentration
of wealth and of the asset holdings of richer households, which include a large
share of entrepreneurs. Second, as shown by Curtin, Juster, and Morgan [12]
and Juster, Smith, and Sta®ord [26], the total wealth implied by the SCF is
very close to the total wealth implied by aggregate data (such as the Federal
Reserve Board °ow of funds accounts); the SCF can thus be used to calibrate
aggregates (for instance, the share of entrepreneurial wealth and the percent-
age of entrepreneurs) in a general equilibrium model such as the one developed
in this paper.
We can use various criteria to classify a household as an entrepreneur,
based on business asset ownership or on self-declared employment status. To
show that the features of the data that we are interested in do not crucially
depend on the particular de¯nition of entrepreneurship being used, we adopt
here various de¯nitions of entrepreneurship. We will then choose the most
appropriate one given our purposes, and we will then use it to calibrate the
model and gauge the model's validity.
In our model, an entrepreneur invests his own wealth in the entrepreneurial
activity, and his income is primarily the return from this activity. We thus
classify as entrepreneurs the households who declare owning a business (or a
share of one) and having an active management role in it.2 Following Gentry
authors upon request.
2The exact question is, \Do you (or does anyone in your family living here) have an
active management role in any of these businesses?"
4and Hubbard (GH), we further restrict the de¯nition of entrepreneurship to
households who own at least $5,000 in actively managed businesses, in order
to isolate people who have made a signi¯cant up-front investment in their
business. We call these GH entrepreneurs.
2.1 Entrepreneurship and borrowing constraints
Several papers have documented the importance of collateral, the correlation
between asset ownership and external ¯nancing, and the relation between
wealth and entrepreneurial entry.
Using tax returns, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [23] study the e®ects
of receiving a bequest on potential and existing entrepreneurs. Interestingly,
the households in their sample are rich, consisting only of individuals who re-
ceived inheritances from substantial estates and also happened to have high
pre-inheritance income (equal to three times the average income for potential
entrepreneurs and six times the average income for existing entrepreneurs).
Contrary to the intuition that only the poor might face borrowing constraints,
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [23] ¯nd that even in their sample the re-
ceipt of a bequest (and thus an increase in wealth) increases the probability
of starting a business. Even more interestingly, they ¯nd that existing sole-
proprietors who receive a bequest not only are more likely to stay in business,
but also experience a substantial increase in the enterprise's receipts. Their
explanation for this ¯nding is that entrepreneurial businesses are undercap-
italized because of liquidity constraints, and they conclude that \...there is
growing evidence that capital market imperfections exert an important in°u-
5ence on business and capital formation" (page 74).
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen's [23] ¯ndings are consistent with those
of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen [17] and Hall [21], who ¯nd that even
corporations are constrained in capital markets.
Gentry and Hubbard [18] analyze SCF data and argue that costly exter-
nal ¯nancing (coupled with potentially high returns on those investments) has
important implications for the saving, investment, and entry decisions of con-
tinuing and potential entrepreneurs.
Evans and Jovanovic [15] estimate a structural model of entrepreneurial
choice and ¯nd evidence of liquidity constraints. Evans and Leighton [16] ¯nd
that the probability of switching into self-employment increases with asset
ownership.3
This evidence thus suggests that entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints
and that the possibility of becoming entrepreneurs and the level of possible
borrowing are related to the level of entrepreneurs' wealth.
The need to accumulate assets in the presence of such constraints may also
generate high saving rates among entrepreneurs (or households planning to
become entrepreneurs). Using di®erent data sets, Gentry and Hubbard [18]
and Quadrini [32] show higher saving rates for entrepreneurs than for the rest
of the population.
Another fact that is interpreted by many as evidence of borrowing con-
straints is that the portfolios of entrepreneurs, even the richest ones, are very
undiversi¯ed. Business wealth constitutes a large share of the entrepreneur's
3More recently, however, Hurst and Lusardi's [25] ¯ndings seem to indicate that this cor-
relation is probably more important for the richest than for the poor would-be entrepreneurs.
61% 5% 10% 20%
> 50% 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.51
> 75% 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.28
> 90% 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.12
Table 1: Each row reports the fraction of GH entrepreneurs with a business
wealth to total net worth ratio higher than the given percentage, among those
that are in the top percent (column) of the wealth distribution.
total wealth, and even the entrepreneur's own assets are often used as col-
lateral. In the SCF, the median ratio of business wealth to net worth (for
the business owners who have more than $5,000 in business assets in 1989)
is 48%, the third quartile is 77%, and the top decile is 96%.4 Table 1 shows
that the share of one's own wealth invested in one's business is high for all
quantiles of the wealth distribution. Approximately half of the net worth is
constituted by business wealth for entrepreneurs both in the top and in the
bottom of the distribution. The last two rows of table 1 show that the percent-
age of entrepreneurs who have more than 75% and 90% of net worth invested
in their own assets stays high even for the richest entrepreneurs. Moskowitz
and Vissing-J¿rgensen [31] also document the poor diversi¯cation of the en-
trepreneurs' portfolios.
Unfortunately, from the SCF it is di±cult to exactly isolate business debts,
and the characteristics of these debts (conditions, interest charged, whether
the amount was limited, and so on). However, the survey asks explicitly about
4Some of the results reported in the data sections had already been computed by Gentry
and Hubbard [18]. Quadrini [32] also reports similar statistics, but computed using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
7whether some of the debts are explicitly collateralized with the entrepreneur's
own private assets. In the survey, 33% of entrepreneurs declare that they cur-
rently use their own assets as collateral. Within this group, the median amount
of collateral is $36,000, the top decile is $300,000, and the top 5% is $570,000.
The median ratio of collateral to business value is 21%, the top decile is 77%,
and the top 5% is 100%. These fractions do not change signi¯cantly across
quantiles of the wealth distribution, thus suggesting that many businesses need
to put up collateral in order to borrow, regardless of their size. These numbers
are just an indication, because they include the use of only personal assets
(other than the business itself) and do not indicate the relation between the
amount borrowed and the size of the business, nor the amount of borrowing
desired by the entrepreneur.
2.2 Entrepreneurship and the wealth distribution
Even though entrepreneurs are only a small fraction of the population, they
hold a large share of total net worth. GH entrepreneurs, for example, constitute
8.7% of the population and hold 39% of total net worth.
Table 2 shows that entrepreneurs, either identi¯ed as by Gentry and Hub-
bard [18] or by self-declared self-employment status, constitute a large share
of the richest households, and own a large fraction of wealth even among the
richest. The second line shows the fraction of wealth held by the correspond-
ing quantile of the richest people that is listed in the ¯rst line of the table:
the households in the top 1% of the wealth distribution hold around 30% of
total net worth, and those in the top 5% hold more than half of the total.
8Top % 1 5 10 20
Whole population
percentage of total net worth held 30 54 67 81
GH entrepreneurs
percentage of households in a given percentile 65 52 42 30
percentage of net worth held in a given percentile 69 60 55 49
Self-employed
percentage of households in a given percentile 62 47 38 26
percentage of net worth held in a given percentile 69 57 52 46
Table 2: First and second rows: percentage of total net worth held by the top
percent of the wealth distribution. Two panels: percentage of entrepreneurs
or self-employed among the households in the top percent of the wealth distri-
bution and share of wealth held by entrepreneurs or the self-employed in those
quantiles.
The ¯rst lines of the other two panels report, respectively, the fraction of GH
entrepreneurs and the fraction of self-employed in the corresponding wealth
quantile. The second line of each panel displays, respectively, the fraction of
total wealth held by entrepreneurs and the self-employed as a fraction of the
total wealth in a given wealth quantile. More than 60% of those in the top 1%,
and almost one-half of those in the top 5%, are entrepreneurs or self-employed,
and they hold, respectively, 69% and 60% of the wealth held by households in
those quantiles. The table also shows that the corresponding statistics for the
self-employed are very close to those for the entrepreneurs.
2.3 More about entrepreneurs
Table 3 uses the SCF to compare various de¯nitions of entrepreneurship. The
percentage of households whose head declares himself self-employed is around
9Percentage in population Share of total wealth
Entrepreneurs 11.5 41.6
GH entrepreneurs 8.7 38.8
Self employed 11.1 39.0
Percentage in population
Self employed who are entrepreneurs 67.5
Self employed who are GH entrepreneurs 52.7
Table 3: Top panel: percentage of various de¯nitions of entrepreneurs in the
population and the corresponding share of the total wealth held. Bottom
panel: percentage of self-employed who are entrepreneurs.
10%, similar to the percentage of entrepreneurs. However, only around two-
thirds of the self-employed have business assets, and only slightly more than
one-half of them have more than $5,000 invested in a business.
There is thus a di®erence between being self-employed and owning business
assets. Some self-employed households do not invest any of their (nonhuman)
wealth in their activity, or invest only a very small amount. The di®erence
between those two groups is highest in the lower quantiles of the wealth dis-
tribution, where the self-employed tend to be poorer than the entrepreneurs,
and many of them have no business assets. For the higher quantiles, however,
the two groups are almost the same. For instance, most (from 85% to 90%,
depending on the year) of the self-employed who are in the top 5% of the
overall wealth distribution are also entrepreneurs according to the GH de¯ni-
tion. Therefore, if one is mainly interested in the total wealth held by those
groups, or in the right tail of the wealth distribution, there is little di®erence
in using either de¯nition. Since, for us, a key aspect of entrepreneurship is
ownership of and investment in business assets, we use the GH de¯nition for
10our computations.
As for the distribution by type of business, roughly one-half of the busi-
nesses are sole-proprietorships, one-quarter are partnerships, and one-quarter
are incorporated. While a few of those who have a management role in a cor-
poration should be classi¯ed as managers rather than entrepreneurs who invest
their own wealth, the previous section shows that most entrepreneurs have a
signi¯cant share of their own wealth invested in their businesses. In fact, the
ratio of business assets to total net worth and the fraction of entrepreneurs
who have collateralized loans are very similar across these various groups, as
well as across various types of business activities.
3 The model
3.1 Demographics
We adopt a life-cycle model with intergenerational altruism. To make the
results quantitatively interesting, we need short time periods. To make the
model computationally manageable, we have to keep the number of stages
of life small. To reconcile these two necessities, we adopt a modeling device
introduced by Yaari [38] and Blanchard [6] and generalized by Gertler [19] to
a life-cycle setting.
Households go through two stages of life, young and old age. A young
person faces a constant probability of aging during each period (1 ¡ ¼y), and
an old person faces a constant probability of dying during each period (1 ¡
¼o). When an old person dies, his o®spring enters the model, carrying the
11assets bequeathed to him by the parent. Appropriately parameterized, this
framework generates households for which the average lengths of the working
period and the retirement period are realistic. Our model period is one year
long.
There is a continuum of households of measure 1. The households are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks, but there is no aggregate uncertainty, as in
Bewley [5].
3.2 Preferences
The household's utility from consumption is given by c1¡¾
1¡¾ . The households
discount the future at rate ¯, and, in addition, they discount the utility of
their o®spring at rate ´.
To study the role of bequests, our model nests life-cycle and fully altruistic
households as two extreme cases. In the purely life-cycle version of the model
individuals put no weight on the utility of their descendants (´ = 0). In the
perfectly altruistic version, individuals care about their descendants as much
as themselves (´ = 1). We assume exogenous labor supply.
3.3 Technology
Many ¯rms are not controlled by a single entrepreneur and are not likely to
face the same ¯nancing restrictions that we stress in our model. Therefore, as
in Quadrini [33], we model two sectors of production: one populated by the en-
trepreneurs and one by \non-entrepreneurial" ¯rms. The non-entrepreneurial






where Kc and Lc are the total capital and labor inputs in the non-entrepreneurial
sector and A is a constant. In both sectors, capital depreciates at a rate ±.
Each person possesses two types of ability, which we take to be exoge-
nous, stochastic, positively correlated over time, and uncorrelated with each
other. Entrepreneurial ability (µ) is the capacity to invest capital more or less
productively. Working ability (y) is the capacity to produce income out of
labor.
Workers can save (but not borrow) at a riskless, constant rate of return.
Entrepreneurs can borrow and invest capital in a technology whose return
depends on their own entrepreneurial ability: those with higher ability levels
have higher average and marginal returns from capital. When the entrepreneur
invests k, the production net of depreciation is given by (1 ¡ ±)k + µkº; with
0 < º < 1.
Entrepreneurs thus face decreasing returns from investment, as their man-
agerial skills become gradually stretched over larger and larger projects. Hence,
while entrepreneurial ability is exogenously given, the entrepreneurial rate of
return from investing in capital is endogenous and is a function of the size of
the project that the entrepreneur implements.
Note that there is no within-period uncertainty regarding the returns of
the entrepreneurial project. The ability µ is observable and known by all at
the beginning of the period. We therefore ignore problems arising both from
13partial observability and costly state veri¯cation and from diversi¯cation of
entrepreneurial risk. The simpli¯cation is adopted to focus only on the e®ect
of the borrowing constraint.
We assume that the entrepreneurs work on their own projects without
hiring labor and that all of the workers are hired by the non-entrepreneurial
sector.
In equilibrium the prices are given by the marginal products of each factor
of production, and the rate of return from investing in capital in the non-
entrepreneurial sector must equate the risk-free rate that equates savings and
investment.
3.4 Credit market constraints
As in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [1] and Kehoe and Levine [27], the bor-
rowing constraints are endogenously determined in equilibrium and stem from
the assumptions that contracts are imperfectly enforceable.
Imperfect enforceability of contracts means that the creditors will not be
able to force the debtors to fully repay their debts as promised, but that the
debtors fully repay only if it is in their own interest to do so. Since both
parties are aware of this feature and act rationally, the lender will lend to a
given borrower only an amount (possibly zero) that will be in the debtor's
interest to repay as promised.
In particular, we assume that the entrepreneurs who borrow can either
invest the money and repay their debt at the end of the period or run away
without investing it and be workers for one period. In the latter case, they
14retain a fraction f of their working capital k (which includes their own assets
and borrowed money), and their creditors seize the rest.
In the absence of market imperfections, the optimal level of capital is only
related to technological parameters and does not depend on initial assets. In
our framework, instead, the higher is the amount of an entrepreneur's own
wealth invested in the business, the larger is the amount that the creditor is
able to recover, and the larger is thus the sum that creditor is willing to lend
to the entrepreneur. Hence, the entrepreneur's assets act as collateral.
As a result, not all potentially pro¯table projects receive appropriate fund-
ing. Households with little wealth can borrow little, even if they have high
ability as entrepreneurs. Since the entrepreneur forgoes his potential earnings
as a worker, he will choose to become an entrepreneur only if the size of the
¯rm that he can start is big enough; that is, he is rich enough to be able to
borrow and invest a suitable amount of money in his ¯rm.
3.5 Households
At the beginning of each period, before making any economic decisions, the
current ability levels are known with certainty, while next period's levels are
uncertain.
Each young individual starts the period with assets a, entrepreneurial abil-
ity µ, and worker ability y and chooses whether to be an entrepreneur or a
worker during the current period.
An old entrepreneur can decide to keep the activity going or retire, while
a retiree cannot start a new entrepreneurial activity. We allow entrepreneurs
15to remain active when old to capture the fact that, while most workers retire
before age 65, entrepreneurs often continue their activity until much later.
3.5.1 The young's problem
The young's state variables are his current assets a, working ability y, and
entrepreneurial ability µ. His value function is
V (a;y;µ) = maxfVe(a;y;µ);Vw(a;y;µ)g; (2)
where Ve(a;y;µ) is the value function of a young individual who manages an
entrepreneurial activity during the current period. In order to invest k, the
young entrepreneur borrows (k¡a) from a ¯nancial intermediary at the interest
rate r, which is the risk-free interest rate at which people can borrow and lend
in this economy. Consumption c is enjoyed at the end of the period. We have
Ve(a;y;µ) = max
c;k;a0fu(c) + ¯¼yEV (a
0;y
0;µ




0 = (1 ¡ ±)k + µk
º ¡ (1 + r)(k ¡ a) ¡ c (4)
Ve(a;y;µ) ¸ Vw(f ¢ k;y;µ) (5)
a ¸ 0 (6)
k ¸ 0: (7)
The expected value of the value function is taken with respect to (y0;µ0), con-
ditional on (y;µ), F(y0;µ0jy;µ) is a ¯rst-order Markov process, and W(a0;µ0)
is the value function of the old entrepreneur at the beginning of the period,
16before he has decided whether he wants to stay in business or retire.
The function Vw(a;y;µ) is the value function for the young who chooses to
be a worker during the current period. We have
Vw(a;y;µ) = max
c;a0 fu(c) + ¯¼yEV (a
0;y
0;µ
0) + ¯(1 ¡ ¼y)Wr(a
0)g (8)
subject to eq. (6) and
a
0 = (1 + r)a + wy ¡ c; (9)
where w is the wage. When the worker becomes old, he is retired, and Wr(a0)
is the corresponding value function.
3.5.2 The old's problem
The old entrepreneur can choose to continue the entrepreneurial activity or
retire. The old person's state variables are therefore his current assets a, his
entrepreneurial ability µ, and whether he was a retiree or an entrepreneur
during the previous period.
The value function of an old entrepreneur is
W(a;µ) = maxfWe(a;µ);Wr(a)g; (10)
where We(a;µ) is the value function for the old entrepreneur who stays in
business. Wr(a) is the value function of the old, retired person, and ´ is the
weight on the utility of the descendants. If ´ = 0, the household behaves as a








subject to eq. (4), eq. (7), and
We(a;µ) ¸ Wr(f ¢ k): (12)
The o®spring of an entrepreneur is born with ability level (µ0;y0). The expected
value of the o®spring's value function with respect to y0 is computed using the
invariant distribution of y, while the one with respect to µ0 is conditional on
the parent's µ and evolves according to the same Markov process that each
person faces for µ while alive. This is justi¯ed by the assumption that the
o®spring of an entrepreneur inherits the parent's ¯rm.
A retired person (who is not an entrepreneur) receives pensions and social
security payments (p) and consumes his assets. His value function is
Wr(a) = max
c;a0 fu(c) + ¯¼oEWr(a




subject to eq. (6) and
a
0 = (1 + r)a + p ¡ c: (14)
3.6 Equilibrium
Let x = (a;y;µ;s) be the state vector for our economy, where s distinguishes
young workers, young entrepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, and old retired. From
the decision rules that solve the maximization problem and the exogenous
18Markov process for income and entrepreneurial ability, we can derive a tran-
sition function M(x;¢), which provides the probability distribution of x0 (the
state next period) conditional on x.
A stationary equilibrium is given by
8
> > > <
> > > :
a risk-free interest rate r and wage rate w,
allocations c(x);a(x), and k(x),
and a constant distribution of people over the state variables x: m¤(x)
such that, given r, w, the following holds:
² The functions c, a, and k solve the maximization problem described
above.
² The capital and labor markets clear. The total labor supplied by the
workers equals the total labor employed in the non-entrepreneurial sector.
The total savings in the economy equal the sum of the total capital
employed in the non-entrepreneurial and in the entrepreneurial sectors.
² The wage and interest rates are given by the marginal products of each
factor of production, and the rate of return from investing in capital in
the non-entrepreneurial sector must equate the risk-free rate that equates
savings and investment.
² The distribution m¤ is the invariant distribution for the economy.
19Fixed Parameter Value Source(s)
¾ 1.5 Attanasio et al. [2]
± 0.06 Stokey and Rebelo [34]
® 0.33 Gollin [20]
A 1.0 Normalization
¼y 0.98 See text.
¼o 0.91 See text.
Py See text. Huggett [24], Lillard and Willis [30]
p 40% of average yearly income Kotliko®, Smetters, and Walliser [28]








Table 4: Parameters of the model.
203.7 Calibration
Table 4 lists the parameters of the model. The ¯rst panel of table 4 shows the
set of parameters that we take from other studies and do not use to match
moments of the data.
We take the coe±cient of relative risk aversion to be 1.5, a value close
to those estimated by, among others, Attanasio et al. [2]. As is standard
in the business cycle literature, we choose a depreciation rate ± of 6%. The
share of income that goes to capital in the non-entrepreneurial sector is 0.33,
and the scaling factor A is normalized to 1. The probability of aging and of
death are such that the average length of the working life is 45 years, and
the average length of the retirement period is 11 years. The logarithm of
the income y process for working people is assumed to follow an AR(1). We
take its persistence to be 0.95, as estimated by, for instance, Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron [36]. The variance is chosen to match the Gini coe±cient
for earnings of 0.38, the average found in the PSID. We assume that the
income and the entrepreneurial ability processes evolve independently; the
exact values for the income and ability processes are described in appendix A.
The social security replacement rate is 40% of average income, net of taxes.
(See Kotliko®, Smetters, and Walliser [28].) In the baseline case we set ´ = 1
(perfect altruism) and then study the no-altruism case.
The second panel of table 4 lists the remaining parameters of the model: ¯,
µ, Pµ, º, and f and their corresponding values in the baseline calibration. We
consider only two values of entrepreneurial ability: zero (no entrepreneurial
ability) and a positive number. This implies that Pµ is a two-by-two matrix.
21Since its rows have to sum to one, this gives us two parameters to calibrate,
corresponding to the persistence of each of the two ability states. We also
have to choose values for º, the degree of decreasing returns to scale to en-
trepreneurial ability, and f, the fraction of working capital the entrepreneur
can keep in case he defaults. This gives us a total of six parameters to calibrate
to the data.5
We use these six parameters to pin down the following moments generated
by the model: the capital-to-output ratio, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
population, the fraction of entrepreneurs exiting entrepreneurship during each
period, the fraction of workers becoming entrepreneurs during each period, the
ratio of median net worth of entrepreneurs to that of workers, and the fraction
of people with zero wealth.
Given the features matched in the calibration, we analyze how well the
model matches the overall distribution of wealth and the distributions of wealth
for entrepreneurs and workers. We then study the role of borrowing constraints
and voluntary bequests.
3.8 Results
The ¯rst row in table 5 displays the aggregate capital-output ratio and several
statistics on the wealth distribution in the United States. The notion of capital
that we use includes residential structures, plant, equipment, land, and con-
sumer durables, and it implies a capital-output ratio of about 3 for the period
5Note that we do not impose an exogenous minimum ¯rm size or investment level, nor
start-up costs. We experimented adding a ¯xed start-up cost and a minimum ¯rm size (both
on the order of $5,000{20,000), but doing so had no signi¯cant impact on our numerical
results.
221959{92 (Auerbach and Kotliko® [3]). The ratio of average wealth to average
income is also about 3. The data pertaining to the distribution of wealth come
from the 1989 SCF. The waves for other years are similar.
In the other rows of the table, we report the corresponding statistics gen-
erated by the simulations of various versions of our model economy.
Capital- Percentage wealth in the top
output Wealth Perc. Perc.
ratio Gini entr. 1% 5% 20% 40% at zero
U.S. data
3.0 .78 8.7% 30 54 81 94 16%
Baseline without entrepreneurs
3.0 .53 0.0% 4 18 53 94 7%
Baseline with entrepreneurs
3.0 .83 8.7% 31 62 85 95 16%
Table 5: U.S. calibration
3.8.1 The model without entrepreneurs
The second row of table 5 refers to the model economy without entrepreneurs.
In this run, we assign zero entrepreneurial ability to everyone and change the
household's discount factor to match the same capital-to-output ratio. All
other parameters, including the general equilibrium prices, are the same as in
the benchmark economy.
These results thus refer to a model economy with labor earnings risk and a
simpli¯ed life-cycle structure. As we can see from the table, this model econ-
omy produces a distribution of wealth that is much less concentrated than
that in the data and that, in particular, does not explain the emergence of





























Figure 1: Distribution of wealth for the whole population. Dash-dot line: data;
solid line: model without entrepreneurs.
the large estates that characterize the upper tail of the distribution of wealth.
Figure 1 compares the data on the distribution of wealth (SCF, 1989 in thou-
sands of dollars) with the one implied by the model without entrepreneurial
choice. While the data on wealth display a fat tail, in the model without
entrepreneurial choice all households hold less than $1.1 million.
3.8.2 The model with entrepreneurs
The third row of table 5 refers to the benchmark economy with entrepreneurs.
In our baseline simulation the equilibrium interest rate r is 6.3%, the share of
total wealth held by entrepreneurs is 34%, compared with 39% in the data,
and the degree of decreasing returns to scale to the entrepreneurial technology
is 0.88, which is a value consistent with those estimated by Burnside, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo [7] and Basu and Fernald [4]. The resulting fraction of total
capital invested by the entrepreneurial sector is 43%, a value very close to the
2440% estimated by Quadrini [33].
This parameterization matches the distribution of wealth very well (¯g-
ure 2) both for the overall population and for that of the entrepreneurs. Figure
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Distribution of wealth in the baseline model with entrepreneurs.
Solid line: workers; dash-dot line: entrepreneurs.
In order to explain entrepreneurial behavior, ¯gure 5 displays the saving
rate6 for people who have the highest ability level as workers during the current
period. The solid line refers to the people who get the high entrepreneurial
ability level during the current period, while the dash-dot line refers to those
who get the low entrepreneurial ability draw. Given the same asset level (and
potential earnings as workers), the people with high entrepreneurial ability
have a much higher saving rate.
Those with low entrepreneurial ability (who are thus workers) exhibit bu®er-
stock saving behavior: if their assets are low, they save because they are expe-
riencing a high ability level as workers and want to build up their bu®er-stock.
If their assets are high enough, they dissave, and the richer they are, the higher
their rate of dissaving. In this simulation, the asset level at which the saving
6The saving rate in the graph is de¯ned as assets in a given period minus assets in the
previous period, divided by total income during the period.





























Figure 4: Distribution of the entrepreneurs' wealth. Dash-dot line: data; solid
line: baseline model.
rate goes from positive to negative is below $1 million.
The people with high entrepreneurial ability, as explained in section 3.4,
become entrepreneurs only if their wealth is above a certain level, denoted in
the graph by a vertical line. The saving rate of those with high entrepreneurial
ability who do not own enough assets to become entrepreneurs is higher than
the one for the workers because ability is persistent, and the workers with
high entrepreneurial ability save to have a chance to start a business in the
future. In this region, the distance between the solid line and the dash-dot
line is solely due to the higher implicit rate of return from saving that one
could obtain becoming an entrepreneur in the future: all households become
workers in this range and earn the same income, but the desire to become
entrepreneurs generates a higher saving rate for those who have such ability.
The saving rate of those with high entrepreneurial ability and enough as-
sets to become entrepreneurs is positive and considerably higher than that




















Figure 5: Saving rate for highest-ability workers. Solid line: with high en-
trepreneurial ability; dash-dot line: with no entrepreneurial ability; vertical
line: asset level at which high-entrepreneurial-ability individuals enter en-
trepreneurship.
for workers. The return on the entrepreneurial activity is high, and the en-
trepreneur would like to increase the size of the ¯rm by borrowing capital.
However, the borrowing constraint limits the size of the ¯rm. In order to ex-
pand the business, the entrepreneur must in part self-¯nance the increase in
capital. The combination of higher returns from the business together with
the budget constraint thus generates a very high saving rate for entrepreneurs.
As the ¯rm expands, the returns decrease. Therefore, the saving rate will also
eventually decrease. (We truncate the axis of the graph for easier readability.)
With only one positive level of entrepreneurial ability (as we assume in
our calibration) and in the absence of borrowing constraints, there would be
only one optimal ¯rm size. Figure 6 shows how in our framework the presence
of borrowing constraints can generate a large amount of heterogeneity in the
¯rm size distribution. The distribution generated by the model exhibits high



























Figure 6: Firm size distribution, baseline model with entrepreneurs.
dispersion and a fat tail; the tail is generated by the entrepreneurs who have
remained in business for a long period (and have possibly inherited the ¯rm
from the parents) and have thus had time to save and increase the size of their
¯rms.
3.8.3 The borrowing constraints
In this section, we examine the e®ect of changing the tightness of the borrowing
constraints. To make the constraints more stringent, we increase f, the fraction
of working capital that cannot be seized by creditors, from 0.75 to 0.85. The
less the creditors can get back, the less they lend to the entrepreneur. This
increase in f could be interpreted as less e±cient enforcement of property
rights by the courts, or as more lenient bankruptcy laws.
Figure 7 shows the maximum amount of investment (including one's own
assets and borrowed funds) for a young entrepreneur who has the highest
ability level as a worker as a function of his own assets. The solid line refers




























Figure 7: Maximum borrowing. Solid line: baseline; dash-dot line: more
restrictive borrowing constraints.
to the baseline model, while the dash-dot line refers to the model with more
restrictive borrowing constraints (and nonrecalibrated ¯). In both economies
the entrepreneurs with few assets cannot borrow. The amount of collateral
necessary to borrow a positive amount in the two economies coincides at low
levels of assets. The entrepreneur with the lowest ability level as a worker must
have at least $16,000 in order to borrow some funds; this amount increases to
$266,000 for the entrepreneur with the highest ability level as a worker. This
happens because a more able worker is better o® in case of default; therefore,
he has to provide more collateral. The key di®erence in the two economies is
that richer entrepreneurs can borrow and invest less in the economy with more
restrictive borrowing constraints. For this reason they need more initial assets
to implement a project of a given size, and it takes them longer to become
rich and own and run a large ¯rm. If the entrepreneur is rich enough, he is
unconstrained.
30Capital- Percentage wealth in the top
output Wealth Perc. Perc.
ratio Gini entr. 1% 5% 20% 40% at zero
U.S. data
3.0 .78 8.7% 30 54 81 94 16%
Baseline with entrepreneurs
3.0 .83 8.7% 31 62 85 95 16%
More stringent borrowing constraints: f = 0:85
2.6 .78 7.9% 26 53 79 93 15%
No altruism: ´ = 0, only involuntary bequests
2.6 .76 8.5% 23 49 77 92 15%
´ = 0, recalibrated ¯
3.0 .80 9.1% 26 57 83 94 16%
Table 6: Borrowing constraints and bequests.
The third line of table 6 reports the e®ects of more restrictive borrowing
constraints. The capital-to-output ratio drops drastically, from 3.0 to 2.6,
and the fraction of entrepreneurs falls from 8.7% to 7.9% as fewer high-ability
individuals can now borrow and start a ¯rm. The decrease in the fraction
of entrepreneurs happens despite an increase of the equilibrium interest rate
from 6.3% to 7.6%, which makes it easier (and faster) for savers with high
entrepreneurial ability to accumulate enough capital to start a business.
An increase in the tightness of the borrowing constraint, as seen in ¯gure 7,
forces entrepreneurs, and in particular rich ones, to borrow less and run smaller
¯rms. They make fewer total pro¯ts and save less, and, as a result, they are
poorer. The distribution of wealth becomes less concentrated; for instance,
the share of total net worth held by the richest 1% decreases from 30% in
the baseline calibration to 26%, and the share of total net worth held by
31entrepreneurs decreases from 34% to 30%.
Hence, as the collateral requirements rise, wealth inequality falls, but this
comes at the expense of lower capital accumulation and output.
3.8.4 Bequests
In the baseline economy households are altruistic toward their o®spring; there-
fore, the total amount of bequests includes both voluntary and accidental be-
quests due to life-span risk. We use our model to study what happens to
entrepreneurial choice and to wealth inequality when households do not care
about their descendants and all bequests are accidental.
The ¯fth line of table 6 displays how the aggregates change when we set
to zero the degree of intergenerational altruism. The absence of the voluntary
bequest motive reduces the incentives to accumulate capital and run larger and
larger ¯rms. On the one hand, younger people are bequeathed less wealth, and
in the presence of borrowing constraints, this means that young potential en-
trepreneurs have fewer resources to start and increase their businesses. On the
other hand, the equilibrium interest rate increases to 8.7%, thus allowing more
high-ability individuals to use the increased proceedings from their earnings to
start a business activity. The net e®ect on the total fraction of entrepreneurs
is a small decrease from 8.7% to 8.5%.
The e®ects on aggregate capital accumulation are large: in the absence of
a voluntary bequest motive to save, the total capital of the economy would
decrease from 3.0 to 2.6. The concentration of wealth would also drop sub-
stantially: the Gini coe±cient of inequality would go from 0.83 to 0.78, and the
fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% from 31% to 23%. As shown also in
32other papers, such as De Nardi [13] and Casta~ neda, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, and R¶ ³os-
Rull [9], voluntary bequests are fundamental in explaining the concentration
of wealth.
In this model economy, voluntary bequests provide an additional incentive
to save to rich entrepreneurs and also generate the intergenerational transmis-
sion of large fortunes (and ¯rms) across generations.
To better understand the role of voluntary bequests, we run another ex-
periment, in which we increase the discount factor ¯ (last line of the table)
to match a capital-output ratio of 3.0. The fraction of entrepreneurs increases
compared to the baseline model, from 8.7% to 9.1%. This e®ect is due to
an increase in the general equilibrium interest rate, which has the same ef-
fect we have discussed above, and to the increase in the household's discount
factor. In this calibration, households have no bequest motive, but are more
patient. This implies that the younger households accumulate more wealth
than in the baseline model, while the old decumulate faster, and thus keep
less wealth, because of the lack of altruism. More people of working age be-
come entrepreneurs, and the old have fewer incentives to continue and expand
the entrepreneurial activity and pass to their o®spring less wealth and smaller
¯rms. This reduces the number and the size of large ¯rms. For these reasons,
the wealth concentration generated by this experiment is lower than the one
in the benchmark economy; for instance, the share of total net worth held by
the richest 1% drops to 26%, down from 31%.
334 Conclusions
We developed and solved numerically a model of wealth accumulation and be-
quests in which entrepreneurs face an endogenous borrowing constraint that
limits the amount that they can borrow. The entrepreneur's wealth acts as col-
lateral, so that the richer the entrepreneur, the higher the amount he can bor-
row. We show that this setup can generate a wealth distribution that matches
the one observed in the data, with a small number of very rich households,
many of whom are entrepreneurs. Because of the relation between wealth
and borrowing limits, entrepreneurs, although richer, have higher saving rates
than workers. We also show that the tightness of borrowing constraints and
voluntary bequests are key forces in determining the number of entrepreneurs
and the size of their ¯rms, as well as the overall wealth concentration in the
population.
These results have implications for policy analysis, such as subsidized loans
to entrepreneurs and estate taxes. Subsidized loans would make it cheaper for
the entrepreneurs to borrow, but would also change their incentives to default,
making the e®ects of this policy a priori ambiguous. Taxing bequests may de-
crease inequality, while at the same time reduce the amount of entrepreneurial
wealth that could be used as collateral, and thus reduce both the number of
entrepreneurs and the total capital of the economy. We leave these issues for
future research.
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A Income and entrepreneurial ability processes
As explained in section 3.7, we assume that the income process is AR(1) and
approximate it with a ¯ve point discrete Markov chain, using the method
described in Tauchen and Hussey [37]. We use an autocorrelation coe±cient of
0.95 (in line with the high persistence found in many microeconomic estimates,
such as Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron [35]) and choose the variance to match
the Gini coe±cient of earnings of 0.38. The resulting gridpoints y for the
income process (normalized to an average of 1) are
£
0:2468 0:4473 0:7654 1:3097 2:3742
¤







0:7376 0:2473 0:0150 0:0002 0:0000
0:1947 0:5555 0:2328 0:0169 0:0001
0:0113 0:2221 0:5333 0:2221 0:0113
0:0001 0:0169 0:2328 0:5555 0:1947








We assume that the entrepreneurial ability process is uncorrelated with the
income process. The two values for ability µ are 0 (meaning no entrepreneurial






The values for µ and Pµ are calibrated as explained in section 3.7.
B The algorithm
The algorithm proceeds as follows.
² Construct a grid for the state variables. The maximum asset level is
chosen so that it is not binding for the household's saving decisions.
² Fix an interest rate r and a wage rate w. Taking r and w as given, solve
for the value functions using value function iteration.
² Construct the transition matrix M. Compute the associated invariant
distribution of wealth, starting from a guess for ¼ and iterating on ¼0 =
M¼0 until (¼0 ¡ ¼) is smaller than a given convergence criterion.
² Compute total savings and total capital invested in the entrepreneurial
sector implied by the invariant distribution. Total capital invested by
the non-entrepreneurial sector is given by the di®erence between total
savings and total capital invested by the entrepreneurs.
² Compute r and w implied by the above quantities and the non-entrepre-
neurial aggregate production function, update the wage and interest rate
used to solve the problem, and iterate until convergence on the factor
prices is reached.
The computation of the value functions is nonstandard because of the pres-
ence of the endogenous borrowing constraints. For each state x, the endogenous
borrowing constraint speci¯es a maximum amount ^ k(x) that an entrepreneur
can borrow. The speci¯c function ^ k depends, however, on the value functions
themselves. In the algorithm we exploit the fact that, for a given set of state
variables, if an entrepreneur runs away with a given level of capital ~ k, he would
also run away with any ~ k +², where ² ¸ 0. We adopt the following algorithm:
initialize ^ k(x) = kmax, the maximum investment level in the economy. We solve
39the value functions, iterating until convergence, conditional on this borrowing
constraint. For each value of x, we compare the value function associated
with remaining an entrepreneur and repaying the debt with the value func-
tion associated with default; we ¯nd the maximum level of investment (and
borrowing) for which the entrepreneur would not default and set the new ^ k(x)
to this new value, and compute again the value functions conditional on this
updated constraint. This procedure is iterated until ^ k does not change across
iterations.
Because we do not constrain the ^ k(x) functions to be decreasing when
we iterate on them, we are not imposing convergence. Together with the
initialization of these functions at the maximum possible level of borrowing,
this implies that if the model has more than one solution, and if the algorithm
converges monotonically, then we converge to the \best" solution, that is, the
one that allows for the borrowing in the economy. In all of our simulations the
algorithm did converge monotonically.
40